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INTRODUCTION
Native American tribes occupy a unique position in the
legal, social, and economic fabric of American society; they
are simultaneously independent sovereigns and dependent
domestic nations. Indian nations have the power to structure
their governments, courts and laws. This authority, however,
is subject to limitations by Congress and oversight by
executive agencies.
Many historical and contemporary
controversies arise from the tension between these principles,
particularly in the context of tribal membership. This
Comment discusses one such controversy surrounding an
August 2011 decision by the Cherokee Nation Supreme
Court. The decision upheld a referendum requiring Cherokee
Indian ancestry for tribal membership, which consequently
stripped 2800 former Cherokee slaves, known as Cherokee
Freedmen, of their citizenship status in the Cherokee Nation.
This shift toward blood quanta requirements for tribal
membership is a trend among several Native tribes, signaling
a reassertion of tribal sovereignty. 1 In most of these cases, as
in the Cherokee Nation controversy, the federal government
also asserts its authority to oversee tribal affairs. The result
is an ongoing struggle to define the appropriate role for the
federal government in Indian matters—one that preserves
tribes’ right to self-determination, while also protecting
individual tribal members from violations of their
fundamental rights.
In this specific case, the importance of protecting the
Cherokee Freedmen from unjust removal based on race alone
1. The blood quantum requirement refers to legislation enacted in the
United States to define membership in Native Tribes. See Paul Spruhan, A
Legal History of Blood Quantum in Federal Indian Law to 1935, 51 S.D. L. REV.
1, 1–3 & nn. 1, 2, 5, 6 (2006). Blood quantum describes the degree of ancestry
for an individual of a particular ethnic or racial group. Id. at 1.
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outweighs the preservation of tribal sovereignty. Federal
involvement is necessary to ensure reinstatement of the
Cherokee Freedmen’s citizenship status. A paradigmatic
shift in the definition of Indian, however, is required to find a
balance between sovereignty and dependence. Not until the
federal government and, as a result, Indian nations redefine
Indian in nonracial terms will these race-based controversies
cease.
This Comment begins in Part I.A with a discussion of the
fundamental principles of Indian Law, namely tribal
sovereignty and the federal government’s oversight role. The
Comment outlines the foundation for tribal independence, as
well as the plenary powers of Congress and the authority of
the Executive Branch as it pertains to tribal sovereignty. The
Comment continues by discussing civil rights as applied to
Indian nations, as well as deferential judicial review of
decisions by executive agencies regarding native tribes.
In Part I.B, this Comment addresses both native and
federal control of tribal membership. Subsequently, this
section discusses the various ways in which the federal
government and Native tribes define Indian. Then, in Part
I.C, the Comment provides a brief history of the Cherokee
Freedmen. Part I.D provides an account of the events
culminating in the current Cherokee Freedmen controversy,
and Part I.E concludes the Background Section with an
overview of current scholarly and popular opinion about the
controversy. In Part II, the Comment outlines the legal
problem, and in its analysis in Part III, the Comment argues
that all the available legal avenues would not adequately
remedy the Cherokee Freedmen’s plight.
Finally, the
Comment concludes with a proposal in Part IV that calls for
federal intervention, but more importantly, a redefinition of
Indian using nonracial factors.
I.

BACKGROUND

A. Principles of Indian Law that Inform Federal-Tribal
Relations
Federal Indian law derives in many respects from three
foundational cases decided by Chief Justice John Marshall: 2
2. Greg Rubio, Reclaiming Indian Civil Rights: The Application of
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McIntosh v. Johnson, 3 Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 4 and
Worcester v. Georgia. 5 The Marshall trilogy establishes two
fundamental principles: the independent, sovereign nature of
Native tribes and the federal government’s responsibility to
protect the tribes. 6 Despite the U.S. Supreme Court’s holding
in Worcester that states have no authority over Indian
matters, no similar decision shelters Native tribes from
federal control. 7 Thus, while Native tribes have the authority
to structure their governments, they are limited by
The
Congress’s plenary powers over their affairs. 8
contradictory juxtaposition of these two notions of Native
tribes—as dependent and helpless on the one hand and
distinct, independent political nations on the other—is at the
root of myriad historical and contemporary Native conflicts. 9
1. Tribal Sovereignty
Due to their inherent tribal sovereignty prior to contact
with European nations, Indian tribes are considered “distinct,
independent political communities” 10 capable of exercising
self-government. 11 The U.S. Constitution, various statutes,
treaties, and court decisions recognize these preexisting
Encompassed in tribes’
powers of self-government. 12
This
independent status is immunity from suit. 13
foundational principle protects Indian tribes’ right to exercise
independent power in their decision making. 14 For example,
tribal governments have the authority to structure their court
systems, craft and apply civil and criminal codes, and define
International Human Rights Law to Tribal Disenrollment Actions, 11 OR. REV.
INT’L L. 1, 12 (2009).
3. Johnson v. McIntosh, 21 U.S. 543 (1823).
4. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1 (1831).
5. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515 (1832).
6. Rubio, supra note 2, at 14.
7. Id. at 13.
8. See Terrion L. Williamson, The Plight of “Nappy-Headed” Indians: The
Role of Tribal Sovereignty in the Systematic Discrimination Against Black
Freedmen by the Federal Government and Native American Tribes, 10 MICH. J.
RACE & L. 233, 247–48 (2004).
9. See Rubio, supra note 2, at 12–13.
10. Worcester, 31 U.S. at 559.
11. FELIX S. COHEN, COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 205
(Nell Jessup Newton et al. eds., 2005).
12. Id.
13. See Williamson, supra note 8, at 247.
14. Id.

5_MOUSAKHANI FINAL.DOC

2013

SLAVERY’S LONG SHADOW

7/23/2013 9:53 PM

941

tribal membership or citizenship. 15 Subject to tribes’ consent
to waiver or express waiver from Congress, sovereign
immunity serves as grounds for dismissal of any cases parties
bring against tribal nations. 16 This forces any potential
parties to seek redress in tribal courts. 17
Immunity from suit is an “integral part” of protecting
tribes’ independence and survival. 18 If tribes had to pay
damages to aggrieved parties, they would deplete community
treasuries and potentially impair the tribes’ ability to perform
their governmental duties. 19 Yet, sovereign immunity has
simultaneously detrimental effects for petitioning parties that
sue tribal nations—it forces those parties to seek redress in
tribal courts alone. 20 Obtaining relief from a court that is
invested in protecting the independent sovereignty of its
nation, however, is likely to prove difficult for aggrieved
Therefore, while tribal sovereign immunity
parties. 21
preserves the sanctity of tribal independence, it also has the
effect in certain circumstances of leaving injured parties
without redress. 22
2. The Plenary Powers of Congress and the Power of the
Executive Branch
Congress exercises broad authority over Indian nations, 23
and it is Congress alone that has the power to limit and
restrain Indian tribal power. 24 Congress derives its plenary
power from three clauses in the Constitution 25: the Indian
Commerce Clause, 26 the Treaty Clause, 27 and Supremacy
15. Id.
16. Lydia Edwards, Protecting Black Tribal Members: Is the Thirteenth
Amendment the Linchpin to Securing Equal Rights Within Indian Country?, 8
BERKELEY J. AFR.-AM. L. & POL’Y 122, 136 (2006).
17. Id. at 137; Williamson, supra note 8 at 252–53.
18. Edwards, supra note 16, at 137; see also Williamson, supra note 8 at
247.
19. Edwards, supra note 16, at 138.
20. See id.
21. See Williamson, supra note 8, at 252–53.
22. See id.
23. See Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 72 (1978) (“Congress’
authority over Indian matters is extraordinarily broad, and the role of courts in
adjusting relations between and among tribes and their members
correspondingly restrained.”).
24. Williamson, supra note 8, at 257.
25. Id.
26. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
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Clause. 28 Therefore, tribal sovereignty “ ‘ exists only at the
sufferance of Congress,’ ” 29 and any changes to federal-tribal
relations are within Congress’ domain alone. 30 Though there
may be certain limitations on Congress’ plenary power over
tribal nations, the Supreme Court has upheld every act of
Congress pertaining to an Indian tribe. 31
Consequently, the Court has reaffirmed Congress’
authority to regulate nearly every aspect of Native life,
including but not limited to: the restructuring of treaty
agreements, 32 the regulation of land and water use rights, 33
the applicability of constitutional rights and provisions to
Indian nations, 34 and determinations of tribal membership. 35
Therefore, despite tribal nations’ inherent sovereignty,
Congressional oversight and control denigrates Native
nations to a “quasi-sovereign” 36 status. 37
Further establishing this “quasi-sovereign” 38 status, the
Department of the Interior (DOI) and the Bureau of Indian
Affairs (BIA) also exert a great deal of power over tribal
affairs. 39 The DOI asserts that it has “ ‘ broad and possibly
nonreviewable authority’ to disapprove or withhold approval
of [any] tribal constitutional amendment regarding
membership criteria.” 40 Furthermore, tribes organized under
27. Id. at art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
28. Id. at art. VI, cl. 2.
29. Christina D. Ferguson, Martinez v. Santa Clara Pueblo: A Modern Day
Lesson on Tribal Sovereignty, 46 ARK. L. REV. 275, 279 (1993) (quoting United
States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 323 (1978)).
30. Williamson, supra note 8, at 257–58.
31. Id. at 258.
32. See, e.g., Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 565–67 (1903).
33. See, e.g., Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians, 526 U.S.
172, 175–76 (1999); Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424
U.S. 800, 802–03 (1976).
34. See, e.g., Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439,
441–42 (1988) (rejecting the notion that the First Amendment’s Free Exercise
Clause applies to U.S. Forest Service’s burdening of a Native American religious
practice); Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 552–54 (1974) (affirming Congress’
authority to exempt hiring of Native Americans by the Bureau of Indian Affairs
from equal protection claims); Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States, 348 U.S.
272, 290–91 (1955) (denying Alaska Indian tribes’ right to bring a Fifth
Amendment takings challenge).
35. See, e.g., Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 72 (1978).
36. Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 208 (1978).
37. See Williamson, supra note 8, at 258.
38. Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 208.
39. SHARON O’BRIEN, AMERICAN INDIAN TRIBAL GOVERNMENTS 197 (1989).
40. Margo S. Brownell, Note, Who Is an Indian? Searching for an Answer to
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the Indian Reorganization Act, or the IRA, must send any
constitutional amendments to the BIA for approval. 41 As will
be discussed in the next section, actions by the DOI and BIA
are reviewed with great deference; hence, federal courts
rarely overturn these two executive agencies’ decisions. 42
3. Federal Judicial Review of DOI and BIA
Determinations
Federal-tribal relations are only subject to judicial
review as authorized by Congress. 43 The Administrative
Procedure Act of 1970 governs determinations made by the
Department of the Interior, including the Bureau of Indian
Affairs. 44 When a court reviews an administrative decision, it
undertakes a three step inquiry by determining: (1) whether
the Secretary of the DOI acted within his authority; (2)
“whether ‘the actual choice made was not arbitrary,
capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in
accordance with law;’ ” and (3) whether the Secretary’s action
“followed the necessary procedural requirements.” 45 The
the Question at the Core of Federal Indian Law, 34 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 275,
307 (2001).
41. Williamson, supra note 8, at 258.
42. See id.
43. Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 568 (1903).
44. Seminole Nation of Okla. v. Norton, 223 F. Supp. 2d 122, 130 (D.D.C.
2002). The Administrative Procedure Act provides in relevant part:
To the extent necessary to decision and when presented, the reviewing
court shall decide all relevant questions of law, interpret constitutional
and statutory provisions, and determine the meaning or applicability of
the terms of an agency action. The reviewing court shall—(1) compel
agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed; and (2)
hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions
found to be—(A) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or
otherwise not in accordance with law; (B) contrary to constitutional
right, power, privilege, or immunity; (C) in excess of statutory
jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or short of statutory right; (D)
without observance of procedure required by law; (E) unsupported by
substantial evidence in a case subject to sections 556 and 557 of this
title or otherwise reviewed on the record of an agency hearing provided
by statute; or (F) unwarranted by the facts to the extent that the facts
are subject to trial de novo by the reviewing court. In making the
foregoing determinations, the court shall review the whole record or
those parts of it cited by a party, and due account shall be taken of the
rule of prejudicial error.
5 U.S.C. § 706 (2006).
45. Norton, 223 F. Supp. 2d at 131 (quoting Citizens to Preserve Overton
Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416–17 (1971) (internal quotation marks
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court cannot supplant the decision of the agency with its own
judgment; as long as the agency articulates a rational
connection between the facts found and the choice made, the
court will defer to the agency. 46
Seminole Nation of Oklahoma v. Norton47 is one case that
illustrates federal judicial deference to DOI and BIA actions.
In facts somewhat analogous to the Cherokee Nation case
that is subject of this Comment, the Seminole Nation held a
referendum election including several proposed constitutional
amendments designed to exclude the Freedmen from
membership in the tribe. 48 The DOI Assistant Secretary
stated in a letter that he would not approve the constitutional
amendments because they were intended to exclude the
Freedmen and they were not sent to the DOI for approval. 49
Despite these warnings, the Seminole Nation subsequently
held an election where the voting eligibility requirements
complied with the constitutional amendments. 50 After the
election, a new Principal Chief was elected. 51 Freedmen cast
ballots, but their votes were not counted in the election
results. 52
In a suit by the Nation requesting declaratory and
injunctive relief, a district court held that “the DOI has
authority, pursuant to Article XIII of the Seminole
Constitution, to approve amendments to the Nation’s
Constitution before they could be adopted.” 53 Additionally,
the district court held that “ ‘ the DOI is independently
authorized pursuant to the Act of 1970 to approve or
disapprove of amendments affecting the selection of the
chief.’ ” 54 Since the DOI explicitly noted past membership in
the Seminole Nation since the 1866 Treaty as the basis for its
objection to the amendments, the court upheld the DOI’s
determination. 55
omitted)).
46. Id.
47. Id. at 122.
48. Id. at 125.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 125–26.
53. Id. at 126.
54. Id.
55. Id.
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An officer with the BIA subsequently sent the Seminole
Nation a letter declaring that it refused to recognize the
results of the election and would not restore a government-togovernment relationship with the Nation’s General Council
until the Nation restored Freedmen representatives to the
General Council. 56 The Seminole Nation brought further
action in federal court, alleging a violation of the
Exercising a highly
Administrative Procedure Act. 57
deferential standard of review, the court in the second case
concluded that the DOI did not act in an arbitrary, capricious,
or otherwise illegal manner. 58 The court cited the DOI’s
authority to ensure that the Nation’s representatives are
valid representatives of all members of the Nation. 59 Thus,
the court rejected the claim that the DOI violated the APA,
and affirmed the DOI’s right to refuse to recognize the
election results and engage in government-to-government
relations. 60 Ultimately, this case demonstrates only one of
many examples of judicial deference to executive agencies in
the realm of Indian affairs.
4. Tribal Sovereignty and Federal Control Over the
Years
Throughout the history of federal-tribal relations, each
component of the Indian nation dynamic—distinct,
independent sovereignty and Congress’ plenary power over
Indian affairs—enjoyed periods of domination in Indian law. 61
In the early decades of the century, Indian law reflected the
nineteenth century policy of allotment and assimilation. 62
Through broad and frequent use of the plenary power, as well
as judicial support in cases such as Ex Parte Crow Dog, 63 the
United States sought to force Indians to substitute their
tribal way of life with the cultural and economic norms of
mainstream American society. 64

56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.

Id.
Id. at 130.
Id. at 148.
Id. at 140.
Id. at 146–47.
Rubio, supra note 2, at 14.
Id.
Ex parte Kan-gi-shun-ca (Crow-Dog), 109 U.S. 556 (1883).
Rubio, supra note 2, at 14.
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Frustration with these policies, however, helped
engender the Indian New Deal in the 1930s. 65 Academic and
political leaders like Felix S. Cohen and John Collier,
respectively, reestablished the right of tribal sovereignty by
helping pass measures such as the Indian Reorganization Act
of 1934 (IRA). 66 The IRA, among other provisions, federally
subsidized Indian economic activity, restored Indian lands,
Most
and reinstated Indian control over education. 67
importantly, through tribal registration and incorporation
with the Bureau of Indian Affairs, the IRA ensured tribal
self-determination and sovereignty. 68 It was not until the
Indian New Deal, and specifically, the IRA, that the
government implemented the principle of inherent tribal
sovereignty long established since the Marshall trilogy. 69
The Indian New Deal shift in favor of a broad and
expansive understanding of tribal sovereignty, however, did
not last. In the 1950s, Congress abruptly exercised its
plenary power to withdraw all federal involvement and aid to
Indian tribes. 70 This termination policy purported to endow
Native Americans with “[f]reedom of action . . . as . . . fullAs Utah Senator Arthur Watkins
fledged citizen[s].” 71
announced, removing federal jurisdiction from the tribes
altogether served to “end the status of Indians as wards of the
government and grant them all of the rights and prerogatives
Critics realized,
pertaining to American citizenship.” 72
however, that it was the federal protection itself that afforded
tribes a means to maintain traditional ways of life. 73 Despite
these concerns, termination policies continued with passage
of Public Law 280 in 1953 74 and the 1954 statutory

65. Id. at 14–15.
66. Indian Reorganization Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 461–79 (2007); Rubio, supra
note 2, at 15.
67. Rubio, supra note 2, at 15.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 15–16.
71. Arthur V. Watkins, Termination of Federal Supervision: The Removal of
Restriction Over Indian Property and Person, 311 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. &
SOC. SCI. 47, 49 (1957).
72. Id. at 55.
73. Rubio, supra note 2, at 16.
74. 83 Cong. ch. 505, 67 Stat. 588 (1953) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §
1162 (2000)).
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termination of the Menominee Indians of Wisconsin. 75
Discontent with these policies, in addition to concern for the
future of tribal culture, lead to a demand for tribal selfdetermination; this self-determination policy soon replaced
the termination era of the 1950s. 76
The Indian Civil Rights Movement of the 1960s not only
reestablished what was destroyed under termination policies,
but also further increased recognition of tribal selfgovernance and sovereignty. 77 This emphasis on tribal selfdetermination, along with the doctrine of tribal sovereign
immunity lives on today. 78 Tribes have greater autonomy in
many aspects of Indian governance, and the federal
government
is
increasingly
deferential
to
tribal
determinations of membership and citizenship. 79 While this
current
trend
strengthens
tribal
sovereignty
and
80
independence, it also creates the context for citizenship
disputes such as those discussed in this Comment.
5. Civil Rights as Applied to Tribal Nations
Reflecting the fundamental principle of tribal
sovereignty, the U.S. Constitution, as well as other civil
rights legislation, does not apply directly to Indian tribes. 81
“As separate sovereigns pre-existing the Constitution, tribes
have historically been regarded as unconstrained by those
constitutional provisions framed specifically as limitations on
federal or state authority.” 82 Only treaties or acts of Congress
can impose federal constitutional laws on tribal
governments. 83 While the federal government does not
provide protections for individual tribal members against
actions by the tribal government, the Indian Civil Rights Act
(ICRA) grants tribal members statutory rights nearly

75. Menominee Indian Termination Act of 1954, 83 Cong. ch. 303, 68 Stat.
250 (1954), repealed by Menominee Restoration Act, Pub. L. No. 93-197, 87 Stat.
770 (1973) (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 903–903f (1994)).
76. Rubio, supra note 2, at 16.
77. Id. at 16–17.
78. See id. at 18.
79. Id. at 17–18.
80. See id. at 17.
81. Groundhog v. Keeler, 442 F.2d 674, 678 (10th Cir. 1971).
82. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 56 (1978).
83. Groundhog, 442 F.2d at 678.
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comparable to the federal Constitution’s Bill of Rights. 84
Utilizing its plenary powers, Congress enacted ICRA to
prevent tribal governments from infringing on the civil rights
of their tribal members. 85 As the Senate Subcommittee on
the Judiciary notes:
The Department of Interior’s bill would, in effect, impose
upon the Indian governments the same restrictions
applicable presently to the Federal and State governments
with several notable exceptions, viz., the 15th amendment,
certain of the procedural requirements of the 5th, 6th, and
7th amendments, and, in some respects, the equal
protection requirement of the 14th amendment. 86

Should a tribal government violate ICRA, civil plaintiffs
cannot seek relief; the only remedy available is a writ of
habeas corpus. 87
In spite of these statutory protections, aggrieved parties
cannot bring suit in federal court against tribal governments

84. The ICRA affords tribal members the following rights:
No Indian tribe in exercising powers of self-government shall—(1)
make or enforce any law prohibiting the free exercise of religion, or
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press, or the right of the
people peaceably to assemble and to petition for a redress of grievances;
(2) violate the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects against unreasonable search and seizures, nor issue
warrants, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation,
and particularly describing the place to be searched and the person or
thing to be seized; (3) subject any person for the same offense to be
twice put in jeopardy; (4) compel any person in any criminal case to be
a witness against himself; (5) take any private property for a public use
without just compensation; (6) deny to any person in a criminal
proceeding the right to a speedy and public trial, to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation, to be confronted with the witnesses
against him, to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his
favor, and at his own expense to have the assistance of counsel for his
defense; (7) require excessive bail, impose excessive fines, inflict cruel
and unusual punishments, and in no event impose for conviction of any
one offense any penalty or punishment greater than imprisonment for
a term of one year and [or] a fine of $5,000, or both; (8) deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of its laws or deprive
any person of liberty or property without due process of law; (9) pass
any bill of attainder or ex post facto law; or (10) deny to any person
accused of an offense punishable by imprisonment the right, upon
request, to a trial by jury of not less than six persons.
25 U.S.C. § 1302 (2001) (footnote omitted).
85. See Thompson v. New York, 487 F. Supp. 212, 229 (N.D.N.Y. 1979).
86. Groundhog, 442 F.2d at 682.
87. Runs After v. United States, 766 F.2d 347, 353 (8th Cir. 1985).
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for violating ICRA. 88
As previously discussed, tribal
governments still enjoy sovereign immunity from suit. 89 The
Supreme Court affirmed the Tenth Circuit’s ruling in Santa
Clara Pueblo v. Martinez 90 that neither the legislative history
of the ICRA nor the implicit implications of the Act itself
suggested a private right of action for individual members
against tribal governments. 91
In Nero v. Cherokee Nation of Oklahoma, 92 the court
reaffirmed tribal sovereign immunity as a defense in civil
rights suits. 93 Alleging violations of his right to vote in tribal
elections and to participate in federal benefits programs, a
Cherokee Freedmen brought suit in federal court. 94 The court
dismissed the claims based on sovereign immunity,
concluding that the Cherokee Nation’s right to self-govern
was purely an internal matter. 95 Similarly, in Stroud v.
Seminole Tribe of Florida, 96 a Florida district court decided
the plaintiff’s employment discrimination claim was
precluded by sovereign immunity. 97 Again, in Spotted Eagle
v. Blackfeet Tribe of Blackfeet Indian Reservation, 98 a district
court reiterated tribal immunity from suit. 99 The court
dismissed the nine plaintiffs’ civil suit because an “ ‘ Indian
person is subject to tribal law.’ ” 100
In these cases, various federal courts recognized that
tribal courts are the proper venue for individual members’
civil rights claims, ICRA or otherwise. 101 These suits rarely
reach tribal courts, and even when they do, the tribal courts
dismiss them, holding that tribal governments are immune

88. See, e.g., Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978); Nero v.
Cherokee Nation of Okla., 892 F.2d 1457 (10th Cir. 1989).
89. See supra Part I.A.1.
90. See generally Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 U.S. 49.
91. See id. at 61, 72.
92. Nero, 892 F.2d 1457.
93. Edwards, supra note 16, at 141.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 141–42.
96. Stroud v. Seminole Tribe of Fla., 606 F. Supp. 678 (S.D. Fla. 1985).
97. Edwards, supra note 16, at 142.
98. Spotted Eagle v. Blackfeet Tribe of Blackfeet Indian Reservation, 301 F.
Supp. 85 (D. Mont. 1969). The plaintiffs sought an injunction eliminating use of
the tribe’s jail, as well as punitive damages. Id. at 87.
99. Edwards, supra note 16, at 142.
100. Id. (quoting Spotted Eagle, 301 F. Supp. at 88).
101. See id. at 140.
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from any federal civil rights guarantees, even the ICRA. 102
Therefore, in many instances, aggrieved members of the tribe
are often left without a forum to redress violations of their
civil rights. 103
B. Native and Federal Control Over Tribal Membership
Each tribe has the power to determine membership
within its political community. 104 Yet, as stated before, 105
Congress also has the authority to legislate in the area of
tribal membership and has done so on multiple occasions. 106
Perhaps most significantly for the purposes of this Comment,
the federal government, through treaty, required certain
tribes to treat former slaves as tribal members. 107 As
previously mentioned, in certain cases, tribal constitutions
themselves include provisions that require approval of
constitutional amendments by the Department of the
Interior. 108 When the DOI finds that tribal membership laws
underlying voter eligibility for an election violate the Indian
Civil Rights Act or the tribe’s own constitution, the DOI often
refuses to continue government-to-government relations with
a tribe’s elected officials. 109
1. Defining Native and Blood Quantum Requirements
Differing definitions of the word Indian within federal
legislation cause many of the problems associated with
determining who is defined as an Indian for governmental
As a result of these numerous and often
purposes. 110
conflicting definitions, some individuals are considered Indian
for one purpose, but non-Indian for another. 111 Under most
circumstances, legislative definitions of an Indian are based
on either tribal status or blood quantum. 112 In certain cases,
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. COHEN, supra note 11, at 212; see Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436
U.S. 49 (1978).
105. See supra Part I.A.
106. COHEN, supra note 11, at 213.
107. See 2 INDIAN AFFAIRS: LAWS AND TREATIES 944 (Charles J. Kappler ed.,
1972).
108. COHEN, supra note 11, at 213 & n.80.
109. Id. at 213.
110. Williamson, supra note 8, 253.
111. See Brownell, supra note 40, at 277.
112. Id. at 278; Williamson, supra note 8, at 253.
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the legislation lacks any definition at all. 113
The federal government marked a long history of reliance
on race to define Indian when it first enrolled Indian tribes
with the passage of the General Allotment Act of 1887 (the
Dawes Act). 114 Enrollment under the Dawes Act formalized
tribal membership by cataloguing individuals into discrete
racial categories, such as “Cherokee by blood,” “Minor
Cherokees by Blood,” “Cherokee Freedmen,” or “Minor
Cherokee Freedmen.” 115 Most current federal and tribal
policies similarly emphasize and rely upon race—through
blood
quantum
requirements—to
determine
tribal
116
To be eligible for tribal membership or
membership.
certain programs, requirements such as this demand that
individuals prove a minimum degree of Indian ancestry. 117
The most common blood quantum degree is one-quarter. 118
Blood quantum requirements derive from the “one-drop
rule,” a form of American social classification that deemed
any individual with one drop of black blood Black. 119 “ ‘ [T]he
‘one-drop rule’ ensured that there would be more Black
laborers for slavery’s human machine . . . blood quantum
ratio[s] ensured that there would be more available land for
Because of
White settlement and development.’ ” 120
intermarriage between tribes, it became increasingly difficult
for Indians to meet blood quantum requirements, and as a

113. Brownell, supra note 40 at 278; Williamson, supra note 8, at 253 .
114. General Allotment Act, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 338 (1887) (codified in part in
scattered sections of 25 U.S.C.). Also known as the Dawes Act, the General
Allotment Act was an integral part of the United States’ broader late nineteenth
century policy of assimilation and allotment. See WILLIAM C. CANBY JR.,
AMERICAN INDIAN LAW: IN A NUTSHELL 20–23 (4th ed. 2004). These policies
resulted in genocidal slaughter among the Lakota Sioux, and, as previously
discussed, were supplanted by Indian New Deal Reforms. See Rubio, supra note
2 at 6 n.6.
115. S. Alan Ray, A Race or a Nation? Cherokee National Identity and the
Status of Freedmen’s Descendants, 12 MICH. J. RACE & L. 387, 391 (2007).
116. See Brownell, supra note 40, at 277; Sharon O’Brien, Tribes and
Indians: With Whom Does the United States Maintain a Relationship?, 66
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1461, 1482–83 (1990).
117. See Brownell, supra note 40, at 280–81; O’Brien, supra note 116, at
1489–90.
118. Williamson, supra note 8, at 254; see Brownell, supra note 40, at 280–81.
119. See Williamson, supra note 8 at 254.
120. Id. (quoting Tiya Miles, Uncle Tom Was an Indian: Tracing the Red in
Black Slavery in CONFOUNDING THE COLOR LINE, 137 (James F. Brooks ed.,
2002).
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result, just as difficult to make land ownership claims. 121
White policy makers used both methods of determining
identity to increase their land ownership and remove as many
obstacles to that growth as possible. 122 Consequently, “Indian
and Black identities are defined by methods that originated
outside of both Indian and Black communities.” 123
Critics identify multiple problems with the federal
government and tribal governments’ use of blood quantum
requirements to determine membership. 124 Some argue that
by utilizing the blood quantum method, the federal
government only supplies services and benefits to a portion of
the population. 125 For instance, the BIA uses blood quantum
requirements to determine eligibility for federal benefits. 126
Critics find this problematic, especially considering the BIA’s
disproportionate reliance on physical characteristics to
determine an individual’s degree of Indian blood. 127
Moreover, to some scholars, use of blood quantum
requirements by tribal governments serve as a way for tribes
to conveniently reduce the number of individuals with whom
they must share limited resources. 128 One scholar explained
that tribes’ decisions to rely on blood quantum requirements
The scholar
reflect the tribal struggle for survival. 129
contends that they utilize this method to maximize wealth or
gain political advantage. 130 Of particular relevance to this
Comment, other scholars and individuals are concerned that
tribes use blood quantum requirements to exclude Blacks
from membership. 131 In sum, both tribal and federal power
over tribal membership resulted in a system with racist roots,
which has negative implications for marginalized and
oppressed individuals in Indian tribes. 132

121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.

Id.
Id.
Id.
See id. at 254–55.
O’Brien, supra note 116, at 1490.
Brownell, supra note 40, at 288–92.
See id. at 288.
See generally id. at 309–12.
Id. at 309.
Id.
Williamson, supra note 8, at 255.
See id. at 253–57.
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C. A Brief History of the Cherokee Freedmen
African Americans began integrating into Indian tribal
communities in the Antebellum South. 133 Initially, as with
other tribes, African Americans entered the Cherokee Nation
as slaves or escaped slaves. 134 African American participation
and status in the tribal community varied greatly within the
Cherokee Nation, as well as throughout all Indian tribes. 135
Despite these differences, most African Americans
experienced a similar “political reality.” 136 It was not until
the close of the Civil War, with the passage of the Civil Rights
Act of 1866 and postwar treaties between the tribe and the
federal government, that African Americans enjoyed formal
status as tribal members. 137 By the terms of the 1866
Reconstruction Treaty with the United States:
all freedmen . . . liberated by voluntary act of their former
owners or by law, as well as all free colored persons who
were in the country at the commencement of the rebellion,
and are now residents therein, or who may return within
six months, and their descendants, shall have all the
rights of native Cherokees. 138

The Cherokee Nation subsequently amended its constitution
to reflect the agreements of the Treaty. 139
Over the years, Freedmen enjoyed varying levels of
acceptance and inclusion in Cherokee tribal community and
The 1975 adoption of a tribal constitution
politics. 140
appeared to firmly establish the legal status of Freedmen in
133. Rubio, supra note 2, at 5.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. 2 INDIAN AFFAIRS: LAWS AND TREATIES, supra note 107, at 944.
139. Ray, supra note 115, at 390; see CONST. OF THE CHEROKEE NATION, art.
III, § 5 (amended 1866) (hereinafter C.N.C.A). The amendment used language
similar to that of the Treaty providing that:
All native-born Cherokees, all Indians, and [W]hites legally members of
the Nation by adoption, and all freedmen who have been liberated by
voluntary act of their former owners or by law, as well as free colored
persons who were in the country at the commencement of the rebellion,
and are now residents therein, or who may return within six months
from the 19th day of July, 1866, and their descendants who reside
within the limits of the Cherokee Nation, shall be taken, and deemed to
be, citizens of the Cherokee Nation.
Id.
140. See Edwards, supra note 16, at 124–27.
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the Cherokee Nation. 141
The constitution defined
membership explicitly and exclusively based upon the Dawes
Rolls. 142 Despite this seemingly broad citizenship provision,
the Tribal Council subsequently enacted more restrictive
membership requirements, demanding proof of Cherokee
blood. 143 Moreover, since 1983, the Cherokee Nation has not
allowed Freedmen to vote in the Nation’s elections. 144
D. The Recent Disenrollment of Cherokee Freedmen
Prior to the most recent 2011 Cherokee Nation Supreme
Court decision focused upon in this Comment, an earlier case
set in motion a series of events that culminated in the current
Cherokee Freedmen controversy. 145 In 2004, Lucy Allen sued
the Cherokee Nation Tribal Council, the Tribal Registrar, and
the Tribal Registration Committee, alleging that the blood
quantum requirement of the Cherokee Nation Constitution
was invalid because it was narrower than the 1975
constitutional citizenship provision. 146
In March of 2006, the Cherokee Supreme Court
invalidated the Tribal Council’s more restrictive enrollment
criteria, and held that Cherokee Freedmen were entitled to
citizenship under the 1975 constitution. 147 The court based
its decision on two main points. 148 First, the court concluded
that the 1975 Constitution did include the Freedmen as tribal
members despite the lack of explicit reference to them. 149 The
court interpreted the 1975 Constitution to define citizenship
based on reference to the Dawes Commission Rolls alone,

141. See C.N.C.A, art. III, § 1 (1975). This provision broadly defined
membership as follows: “All members of the Cherokee Nation must be citizens
as proven by reference to the Dawes Commission Rolls . . . .” Id.
142. Ray, supra note 115, at 390–91.
143. See id. at 392. As defined by the subsequent legislative acts, “[t]ribal
membership is derived only through proof of Cherokee blood based on the Final
Rolls.” C.N.C.A. ch. 2, § 12(A).
144. Edwards, supra note 16, at 133.
145. See Rubio, supra note 2, at 6.
146. Id. at 7.
147. Allen v. Cherokee Nation Tribal Council, JAT-04–09 (Cherokee Nation
Jud. Appeals Trib. 2006), available at http://www.cherokeecourts.org/Portals
/73/Documents/Supreme_Court/Opinions/JAT-04-09%2054-Opinion%203-706.pdf. The court noted that “there is no express ‘by blood’ requirement for
citizenship in the Constitution.” Id. at 21.
148. See id. at 17–18.
149. Id. at 17.
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which did not mandate any by blood requirement. 150 Second,
the court held that because the 1975 Constitution did not
define membership in terms of blood quanta, the Tribal
Council lacked the authority to further restrict citizenship
requirements. 151 According to the court, only a constitutional
amendment voted upon by Cherokee Nation citizens could
alter citizenship requirements. 152 One estimate concluded
that the court’s ruling made up to 45,000 individuals with
Cherokee Freedmen ancestry eligible for Cherokee
citizenship. 153
It was soon after this decision that Cherokee political
leaders mobilized and galvanized support for a referendum
election on that precise issue. 154 Principal Chief Chad Smith
expressed concern that the ruling could upset the political
composition of the tribe. 155 As a result of his efforts, the
Tribal Council approved a petition for a tribal vote on a
constitutional amendment that would require proof of
Cherokee blood for citizenship. 156 In October of 2006, the
Cherokee Supreme Court held that there were enough
signatures to hold a special election. 157 On March 3, 2007, the
amendment passed by an overwhelming majority (seventyseven percent). 158
In August 2011, the Cherokee Nation Supreme Court
upheld the referendum, rejecting the notion that the 1866
Treaty
granted
Freedmen
Cherokee
citizenship. 159
150. Id.
151. See id.
152. See id. at 20. “If the Cherokee people want to change the legal definition
of Cherokee citizenship, they must do so expressly.” Id.
153. Ray, supra note 115, at 392.
154. See id. at 392–93.
155. See id. at 392.
156. See id. at 393.
157. Order Determining the Numerical Sufficiency of the Signatures Counted
by the Election Commission Concerning the Initiative Petition “Proposing an
Amendment to Article IV, Section I of the Cherokee Constitution of 1999” and
Article III, Section I of the Cherokee Constitution of 1975, SC-AD-06-06
(Cherokee Nation Sup. Ct. 2006), available at http://www.cherokeecourts.org
/Portals/73/Documents/Supreme_Court/Opinions/SC-AD-06-06.pdf.
158. Ray, supra note 115, at 393–94. Freedmen granted citizenship after the
2006 Cherokee Supreme Court decision were eligible to vote on the proposed
constitutional amendment. Id.
159. James MacKay, The Cherokee Nation Must be Free to Expel Black
Freedmen, THE GUARDIAN (Sept. 17, 2011, 7:00 AM), www.guardian.co.uk
/commentisfree/2011/sep/17/cherokee-nation-black-freedmen.

5_MOUSAKHANI FINAL.DOC

956

SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW

7/23/2013 9:53 PM

[Vol. 53

Consequently, 2800 Cherokee Freedmen lost citizenship
status, which means that they are no longer eligible to receive
food aid and medical services. 160 Furthermore, this decision
significantly impacted the impending principal chief
election. 161 The previous election was too close to determine a
winner, so on September 24, 2011, the Nation held a special
election to settle the runoff between Chad Smith, the
incumbent (who opposed Freedmen tribal membership), and
opponent Bill John Baker. 162 The exclusion of Freedmen
votes potentially changed the results of the election. 163
In response, the BIA threatened not to recognize the
outcome of the election, which has the potential to lead to a
constitutional crisis for the Cherokee Nation. 164 As Assistant
Secretary for Indian Affairs Larry Echo Hawk wrote in a
letter to acting principal chief Joe Crittenden: “The
department’s position is, and has been, that the 1866 treaty
between the U.S. and the Cherokee nation vested Cherokee
freedmen with rights of citizenship in the nation, including
the right of suffrage.” 165 Furthermore, the U.S. Department
of Housing and Urban Development also took action, freezing
thirty-three million dollars of funds. 166 This recent decision
reignited conversations about the proper role of the federal
government in Indian affairs.
E. Tribal Sovereignty or Racial Justice?
Scholarship and opinion on this issue seems to take one
of two perspectives: either that tribal sovereignty preserves
the right of the Cherokee Nation to expel black Freedmen, or
that the disenrollment of Freedmen is an atrocious civil

160. Id.
161. See Lenzy Krehbiel-Burton, Cherokee Nation Court Terminates
Freedmen Citizenship, TULSA WORLD (Aug. 23, 2011, 2:28 AM),
http://www.tulsaworld.com/news/article.aspx?subjectid=11&articleid=20110823
_11_A12_TAHLEQ813989.
162. See Special Election for Cherokee Nation Chief Begins, REAL CLEAR
POLITICS (Sept. 24, 2011), http://www.realclearpolitics.com/new/ap/politics
/2011/Sep/24/special_election_for_cherokee_nation_chief_begins.html
163. MacKay, supra note 159.
164. Id.
165. Id. (quoting Letter from Larry Echo Hawk, Assistant Sec’y of Indian
Affairs, to Joe Crittenden, Acting Principal Chief of the Cherokee Nation (Sept.
9, 2011)).
166. Id.
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rights violation that calls for federal intervention. 167 Those in
favor of tribal self-determination argue that as a sovereign
nation, the Cherokees should be free to “determine[] its
citizenship by a Constitution approved by [its] people.” 168
These scholars and individuals emphasize that ancestry and
clan define the essence of Cherokee identity. 169 Therefore,
they contend, the Cherokee Nation should be allowed to
require documented lineal biological descendants from
Indians by blood. 170
Other individuals on this side of the debate support tribal
sovereignty because they believe federal involvement will
create more problems than it will solve. 171 Viewing federal
response to the court decision as another attempt by the
United States government to deny the Cherokee’s right to
self-determination, supporters point to a line of failed past
U.S. efforts as a warning of things to come. 172 From the Trail
of Tears cleansing to the destructive termination policies of
the 1950s, these scholars posit that there is nothing to
suggest that current federal intervention will have different
results. 173
Those opposing the Cherokee Nation decision to expel the
Freedmen rely on principles of racial justice to justify their
cause. 174 They argue that all societies with histories of
slavery, including the Cherokee Nation, have an obligation to
grant citizenship rights to former slaves and their
Freedmen supporters claim that the
descendants. 175
Cherokee Nation cannot undo the 1866 Treaty that granted
the former slaves citizenship. 176 They assert that tribal

167. See Tribal Rights vs. Racial Justice, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 15, 2011,
http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2011/09/15/tribal-sovereignty-vs-racialjustice.
168. Cara Cowan-Watts, It’s About Ancestry, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 16, 2011,
http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2011/09/15/tribal-sovereignty-vs-racialjustice/being-an-indian-its-about-ancestry.
169. Id.
170. See id.
171. See MacKay, supra note 159.
172. See id.
173. See id.
174. See Tiya Miles, Why the Freedmen Fight, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 15, 2011,
http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2011/09/15/tribal-sovereignty-vs-racialjustice/wjy-the-freedmen-fight.
175. Id.
176. See id.
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governments cannot encroach upon Freedmen’s previously
granted individual rights. 177
Furthermore, opponents of the recent Cherokee Nation
court decision assert that Indian tribes will not be able to
exercise a strong form of sovereignty until non-Indians in
their communities become a part of their membership and
governance structure. 178 These scholars suggest that Indian
Nations will be subjugated to federal intervention if they
refuse to enfranchise Freedmen. 179 They argue that factors
such as cultural assimilation should be used to determine
tribal citizenship. 180 Ultimately, Freedmen supporters argue
that the Cherokee Nation should not breach justice and
continue racist membership policies. 181
II. IDENTIFICATION OF THE LEGAL PROBLEM
The plight of the Cherokee Freedmen poses an
interesting and complex legal question: whether the expulsion
of the Freedmen is a legitimate exercise of tribal sovereignty,
or a reversion to the Jim Crow era that demands intervention
by the federal government. As previously discussed, the
power to determine tribal membership is central to tribal
independence and self-determination. 182 Yet, this Native
power is restrained; Congress and executive agencies, namely
the DOI and BIA, regulate and oversee Indian affairs, even in
the area of tribal membership. 183 Despite the individual
protections Congress enacted in ICRA, excluded Cherokee
Freedmen are without recourse in tribal courts. 184 Therefore,
absent a sudden and unlikely change by the Cherokee Nation
itself, any restoration of Freedmen citizenship will require
further Congressional action. Considering the turbulent
history of federal regulation in the area of citizenship, this

177. See Rubio, supra note 2, at 10.
178. Matthew L.M. Fletcher, A Weak Sovereign, N.Y. TIMES,
http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2011/09/15/tribal-sovereignty-vs-racialjustice/cherokee-nation-underhanded-racial-politics (last updated Jan. 22,
2013).
179. See id.
180. See id.
181. See id.
182. See supra Part I.A.1.
183. See discussion supra Part I.A–B.
184. See supra Part I.A.5–B.1.
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possibility is alarming to many. 185 Ultimately, in this case,
justice for the Cherokee Freedmen is in tension with the
fundamental notion of tribal sovereignty.
III. ANALYSIS
Under current law, the Cherokee Freedmen do not have
an adequate remedy for their harm. Absent contrary action
by the Cherokee Nation itself, their exclusion from tribal
membership stands.
The Cherokee Nation can invoke
immunity from suit as an affirmative defense, which would be
grounds for dismissal of any case brought by a Cherokee
Freedman. 186 This principle of law preserves Indian tribes’
independent decision-making power and ability to perform
governmental functions, but in this instance, has the adverse
effect of promoting racist policies.
Furthermore, Cherokee Freedmen cannot pursue a suit
in tribal court under ICRA. 187 As already stated, these courts
have a vested interest in protecting the sovereignty of the
Cherokee Nation. 188 Moreover, considering that the Cherokee
Nation Supreme Court upheld the constitutional amendment
disenrolling the Freedmen, it is highly unlikely that the court
would even hear an ICRA claim, and it is just as unlikely that
the court would decide in favor of the Freedmen. The court
would be reluctant not only to reverse itself, but also to
challenge
the
constitutional
amendment
approved
overwhelmingly by the people. Thus, neither federal nor
tribal courts provide a forum for Cherokee Freedmen to seek
redress.
In addition, though executive agencies can take certain
actions, they cannot provide quick or satisfactory redress for
the Cherokee Freedmen. Since the Cherokee Nation is
organized under the IRA, it must send any constitutional
amendments to the BIA for approval. 189 As in Seminole
Nation v. Norton, the BIA could refuse to approve the recent
amendment to the Cherokee Nation Constitution. 190
Moreover, the BIA, as it did in Seminole Nation v. Norton,
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.

See supra Part I.E.
Edwards, supra note 16, at 136.
See Runs After v. United States, 766 F.2d 347, 353 (8th Cir. 1985).
See Edwards, supra note 16, at 140.
Williamson, supra note 8, at 258.
See supra Part I.A.3.
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could refuse to recognize the results of the election and cease
government-to-government
relations
until
Freedmen
citizenship is reinstated. 191 It is likely that, as in Seminole
Nation v. Norton, federal courts would uphold BIA
determinations. 192
With facts similar to those of Seminole Nation v. Norton,
it is likely that any BIA determinations would survive the
three-step inquiry governing the judicial review of
administrative decisions. 193 Since the Cherokee Constitution
provides that the BIA has the power to approve constitutional
amendments, the Secretary would certainly be acting within
his authority. In addition, acting to combat racist policies
and encourage the Cherokee Nation to reinstate Freedmen
citizenship is not “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of
discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.” 194
Lastly, if the BIA acted as it did in Seminole Nation v.
Norton, it would be following the necessary procedural
requirements.
While these BIA actions would be upheld by federal
courts and eventually remedy the Freedmen’s plight, it would
leave them without food aid and medical services until years
of litigation came to an end. Furthermore, these remedies
would not address the ongoing trend among tribal nations to
redefine membership in terms of blood quanta. Thus, current
actions available to executive agencies, though able to
ultimately redress some of the Freedmen’s injuries, do not
address the underlying issues of tribal identity and
membership. In conclusion, none of the current legal avenues
for Cherokee Freedmen provide a just and adequate remedy
for their grievances.
IV. PROPOSAL
Based on the complex nature of the federal-tribal
relationship, as well as the turbulent and oppressive history
between the Cherokee Nation and Cherokee Freedmen, no
single solution will prove sufficient to solve the problem.
Most fundamentally, the federal government should

191.
192.
193.
194.

See generally supra Part I.A.3.
See supra Part II.
See discussion supra Part I.A.3.
5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2004).
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reexamine the way it defines an Indian. Blood quantum
requirements derive from the federal classification methods
that date back to the Dawes Rolls, and as long as the federal
government continues to define Indian by racial means, the
Cherokee Nation will likely follow suit. 195 Because the
Cherokee Nation, like other tribes, relies on federal
definitions of Indian to qualify for aid and eligibility for
programs, the tribe continues to perpetuate these racial
categories.
Cherokee Nation political leaders and tribal members
further reinforce this lineage distinction by calling others to
preserve the tribal political community by excluding the
Freedmen.
In place of racial definitions, the federal
government, as well as tribal nations, should redefine Indian
using factors such as cultural and political assimilation. 196
Ultimately, a paradigmatic shift in understandings of tribal
identity is essential to solve the recurring problem of tribal
membership determinations.
Until that shift occurs, Congress and the DOI should
take practical steps to redress the Freedmen’s harm. The
BIA should act as it did in the Seminole Nation case, refusing
to recognize the election results and engage in government-togovernment relations until the Freedmen’s citizenship status
is reinstated. Furthermore, Congress could strengthen the
ICRA by adding a cause of action so that injured parties, such
as the Freedmen, can seek recourse for civil rights violations
in federal court.
Though these solutions may detract to some degree from
tribal sovereignty, this further limitation on tribal selfdetermination serves the greater purpose of ensuring racial
justice, a subset of justice itself. The fundamental unfairness
here is that the Cherokee Freedmen are being deprived of a
right to which they have a legitimate claim solely on account
of their race. While preserving the Cherokee Nation’s ability
to determine membership in its tribe is an important aspect
of the tribe’s right to self-determination, this autonomy
should not extend so far as to promote racist policies and
outcomes.
As previously mentioned, blood quantum
requirements are archaic measures, used historically to
195. See discussion supra Part I.B.
196. See discussion supra Part I.E.
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create artificial differences and promote racist laws, such as
miscegenation statutes. 197 Ultimately, even though extensive
federal and congressional oversight would threaten tribal
sovereignty, federal involvement is necessary to prevent
racial injustice.
CONCLUSION
In sum, the Cherokee Freedmen controversy serves as a
microcosm for the greater struggle to strike a balance
between tribal sovereignty and federal oversight. Indian
control over membership is the very essence of tribal
independence. Yet, when that definition relies on outdated
blood quanta requirements and excludes individuals solely
based on their race, justice calls for federal intervention;
tribal sovereignty does not justify racist policies. All the
current legal avenues available to the federal government
and its executive agencies, however, would not adequately
address the Freedmen’s grievances or solve the greater
problem of fairly defining Native identity. Not only must the
federal government get involved, but it must also redefine
tribal membership in nonracial terms, which would have the
effect of allowing and encouraging Native tribes to do the
same. Ultimately, it will not be until this paradigmatic shift
occurs that controversies such as that of the Cherokee
Freedman can truly be resolved and perhaps even prevented.

197. See supra Part I.B.

